UPC Weekly - The latest on preliminary injunctions at the UPC – Part 2

Aled Richards-Jones, Matthew Naylor

3 min read

UPC Weekly brings you timely, thoughtful and joined-up insight into the evolving landscape of patent litigation at the Unified Patent Court.

2026 Week 38

This is Part 2 of our survey of recent PI cases issued by the UPC over the summer. Part 1 last week took a look at a three decisions of particular interest in the medical devices space. This week, we look at three further decisions.

ParTec v. Lenovo

UPC_CFI_2258/2026, LD Düsseldorf, 30 June 2026

This was a request for an ex parte PI, and in the alternative for the fastest possible inter partes hearing. The LD Düsseldorf concisely dismissed the requests.

ParTec sought a PI against three Lenovo entities in relation to supplying software said to indirectly infringe EP 3 743 812 B1. The chronology was somewhat unusual.

ParTec had pending UPC infringement proceedings against Lenovo for supplying a first version of software (termed “the first attacked embodiment”). ParTec then filed a Supplemental Statement of Claim alleging infringement on the basis of new software which contained a particular NVIDIA-integrated stack (termed “the second attacked embodiment”). ParTec brought a PI application on the basis of the second attacked embodiment, arguing that Lenovo had since shifted to supplying this embodiment after infringement proceedings had been issued and without disclosing that fact to ParTec in ongoing correspondence between the parties. Meanwhile, ParTec had sued NVIDIA directly (and unsuccessfully) at the LD Munich in a related action on the same patent, whose appeal was pending.

On the ex parte limb, the LD reiterated that ex parte PI relief requires either a demonstrable risk of evidence destruction or a showing that any delay would cause irreparable harm, neither of which ParTec had shown. It was not apparent to the LD why Lenovo should have had an obligation to disclose the second attacked embodiment in inter-partes correspondence, when the subject of that correspondence had been the infringement proceedings relating to the first attacked embodiment. The LD further noted that the proceedings involved particularly complex technology, which also weighed in favour of hearing Lenovo. Further still, the LD stated that the bar for an ex parte PI was higher still in the context of ongoing merits proceedings.

On ParTec’s alternative request for an inter partes hearing as soon as possible, the LD disposed of this by firstly noting the impracticality of serving the Hong-Kong based Lenovo third defendant with such an application in ParTec’s desired timeframe, and secondly by detailing why ParTec’s application disclosed no necessity for provisional measures.

The LD held that, where an application is based on an allegedly ongoing, irreparable loss of already-established market share, the applicant must provide "a detailed and substantiated account of the relevant market situation" as it stood before the allegedly infringing product entered the market. The LD’s view was that the generalised assertions by ParTec relating to its market were not specific or substantiated enough.

The LD also noted that Lenovo’s selling of the first attacked embodiment pre-dated the acts complained of in the PI application. It held that a PI would therefore not preserve the status quo but would rather alter an established market situation in which Lenovo already offers and distributes a competing alternative. Moreover, the LD noted that the first attacked embodiment would be non-infringing on the basis of the claim construction adopted by the LD Munich in the related ParTec/NVIDIA case, and it observed, pointedly, that ParTec “expressly chose not to discuss the Munich Decision further in the present proceedings”. 

SharkNinja v Groupe SEB

UPC-CoA-61/2026, 21 August 2026

The CoA reversed a finding of likelihood of invalidity by the LD Paris and proceeded to grant SharkNinja’s requested PI. The decision includes guidance on how to apportion costs when an application succeeds on the basis of only one of two asserted patents.

SharkNinja's PI application against SEB's "Cookeo Infinity" multi-cooker range, based on EP 3689198 B1 and originally also EP 3689201 B1 (withdrawn before the LD Paris hearing), had been dismissed at first instance on the basis that Chinese utility model "Tredy" anticipated the claims. This finding was reversed by the CoA, which held EP’198 more likely than not valid and infringed by SEB’s product. It was interesting to see the CoA acknowledge that their written decision differed from the preliminary opinion expressed at the start of the oral hearing, in view of the submissions of the parties.

This means that, after the appeal, SharkNinja were successful but with only one of the patents. The CoA explained that the apportionment of costs could be assessed in different ways. On the one hand, it would usually be appropriate to consider the relative value of the two patents. On the other hand, in some cases, the court would consider the actual costs incurred in relation to each patent.

On the facts, the CoA awarded SharkNinja its costs of the appeal and its costs of the first instance proceedings relating to the surviving EP’198, whilst leaving the first-instance order in respect of EP’201 in SEB’s favour undisturbed.

The interim costs award contained a €50,000 sting in the tail for SharkNinja. The CoA confirmed the working rule that interim costs awards are capped at 50% of the applicable R. 152.2 RoP ceiling, noting that the ceiling must be calculated by reference to the value attributable to the surviving patent only. The CoA calculated that the working rule ceiling of 50% translated into an interim award for SharkNinja of €150,000 for the first instance proceedings (being 25% of the €600,000 ceiling applicable to the case value of €7,500,000) and an award of €200,000 for the appeal proceedings (being 50% of the €400,000 ceiling applicable to the case value of €3,750,000 attributable to EP’198 alone). This came to a total interim costs award of €350,000. However, SharkNinja had only requested €300,000 by way of interim award of costs covering both instances. The CoA therefore awarded €300,000, since this was the maximum interim award of costs requested.

Oxford Nanopore Technologies v. MGI Tech

UPC_CFI_2307/2026, LD Munich, 17 September 2026

Bringing us right up to date is a PI granted by the LD Munich in the field of gene sequencing technology. The claimant ONT initially started the PI proceedings based on four patents but then narrowed this down to two: EP 2422198 B1 and EP 2715343 B1. The proceedings named four defendants in total in the MGI group, but of these only the first (domiciled in Germany) was served. The remaining defendants have addresses in China. As we have seen with other UPC proceedings, service on Chinese entities can be particularly challenging and even at the time of issuing the PI order, the other defendants had still not been served with the PI proceedings. Notably, though, they are involved in parallel UK proceedings in an action involving trade secrets.

So how did the court deal with the defendants? On the one hand, we have a PI application which is naturally urgent, with one defendant served but the other defendants not taking part. The LD’s approach was simple – granting the PI against the first defendant, taking into account some aspects of the allegations against the other defendants. The court also separated the proceedings against the other defendants, inviting ONT to pay additional court fees for the PI application against the other defendants. With a PI in place against the first defendant, it is presumably up to ONT whether they actually do pay the additional court fees in order to pursue a PI against the other defendants, or simply include them in the subsequent infringement proceedings on the merits. More on this below.

ONT requested a PI not only for the UPC territory but also for non-UPC states such as UK and Switzerland. Given that the first defendant is domiciled in Germany, this was allowed without a fuss, based on the principles of the CJEU BSH case (explained further in UPC Weekly 2026 w23).

A key part of the dispute was whether there was infringement inside the UPC territory, or imminent infringement. Based on MGI’s own press releases, the LD concluded that a relevant prototype apparatus must have been imported into Germany. There was also literature indicating that visitors to the MGI facility would be able to test workflows using representative samples, apparently using the apparatus. The LD concluded that the importation of the apparatus was an act of infringement and that the first defendant was acting in a common design with the remaining defendants in a manner constituting an imminent threat of infringement.

On timing, MGI argued that ONT’s PI application was either too early or too late. Too early because there was no infringement and no imminent infringement. The LD disagreed with that as explained above. Too late (and therefore with an undue delay) because ONT should have been aware of MGI’s activities earlier, as indicated by the ongoing UK proceedings and also parallel proceedings in Australia. Dealing with this point, the LD referred to CoA case law in which the patentee is not under a duty to monitor the market (see UPC Weekly 2026 w27). The starting pistol was fired for the UPC action on 19 May 2026 – the date that ONT became aware of advertising of the product on LinkedIn by MGI in relation to UPC territory. The PI application was filed on 26 June 2026, and this was considered fast enough.

The PI order includes injunctive relief but also includes a requirement for MGI to deliver up their relevant products inside the territorial scope of the PI to ONT and to provide information on the quantities and origins of the products within 14 days of service of the PI order.

For a PI to remain in force, the claimant must start full infringement proceedings within a deadline set by the court. Usually, this is within about a month of the PI being awarded. However, here, the LD anticipated that it might take MGI longer to comply with the order to provide information, despite the threat of penalty payments. Therefore the LD set the time period for ONT to start full infringement proceedings only to start once that information is provided.

 

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